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

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 12 - 23 Mar 45

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JUN 21 1966

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Kendall J. Fielder

KENDALL J. FIELDER
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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

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COVER PAGE:- IWO JIMA D-Day
(Official US Navy Photograph)
See following pages for additional pictures of IWO.

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On the following four pages are reproduced aerial photographs of IWO JIMA. They continue the view shown on the cover page from a progressively closer point of view. The cover page photo and the first of those following were taken on D-Day. The others were taken on D/ 1. They are all Official US Navy Photographs.

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IWO JIMA D -DAY

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

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IWO JIMA D + 1 DAY

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IWO JIMA D+2½ DAY

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

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IWO JIMA D+3 DAY

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Japanese Suicide Boats

(From SWPA Daily Summary No 1060, 19/20 Feb 1945)

A Japanese captured in the Manila Bay area stated that at the time of our landing there were 100 suicide boats around the shores of CORREGIDOR Island. These boats were kept in tunnels at various points around the island (from which they could be launched by means of dollies) or concealed above ground, particularly between SAN JOSE Point and Camp Point. The boats were described as 20 feet long, having a speed of 20 knots and being manned by a single naval volunteer. Although they mounted no guns, the boats carried a 250 kilo (551 lbs) charge in the bow which could be detonated either by key or on impact. It is considered probable that boats attacking our shipping around MARIVELES last week came from CORREGIDOR. As our advances on CORREGIDOR continue, such of these boats as may still be serviceable will probably attempt to retire to CANDABAT Swamp (the only sector of the MANILA Bay area not immediately threatened by our ground forces) until remunerative targets in the form of our large vessels, enter the inner harbor.

A civilian tugboat captain captured by our PT's on 16 Feb reports the enemy has converted 10 barges to torpedo boats, armed with two torpedoes each. These improvised craft were at that time moored alongside the hulks of sunken vessels within the MANILA Breakwater, and will probably be used in the same manner as the suicide craft mentioned above.

Carbon Monoxide for CW

(From Monthly Summary Report No 13, 43d Chemical Laboratory Co, 18 Feb 1945)

Attention has been drawn to the increasing number of captured documents and captured items of materiel which treat Carbon Monoxide as a War Gas.

Five kits are known to this laboratory which enables the enemy to detect the presence of CO in the air, and it is a well known fact that the Japanese Army 99 canisters contain roughly 10% hopcalite mixed with the charcoal absorbent. The hopcalite is a catalyst for the combustion of CO in air. Furthermore, both the Japanese Army and Navy have special CO canisters.

Although the evidence listed above is far from conclusive it nevertheless justifies the drawing of the following tentative conclusions:

1. The Japanese may expect us to use CO containing agents.
2. They may have plans to use such agents against us.

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Iwo Jima Operation

(From Forward Observer's Reports, 26 and 28 February, 1945)

The following discussion of the IWO JIMA operation was prepared from two reports submitted by a G-2, USAFPOA forward Observer, as of 26 and 28 February. It should be noted that the following consists only of observations made through those dates.

The enemy defenses prepared on IWO JIMA were the most difficult encountered in Marine history, and the island demonstrated itself as the most thoroughly prepared for defense yet encountered in the Pacific.

Attack operations were seriously hindered by the heaviest and best coordinated artillery and mortar fire that the Japs have yet thrown out. On D Day and D/1 and D/2 fire of these types was particularly heavy on the beaches and areas immediately adjacent to them. Heavy guns hidden around SURIBACHI and in the north of the island were aided by good observation from SURIBACHI and Hill 382, and caused considerable casualties and damage in the many supply dumps on and near the beaches. Radio intercepts of Jap orders showed that gun fire had been preplanned and that reference points had been set up all over the island for quick adjustment of fire. Loss of materiel was high on all of our beachheads and in the vicinity of SURIBACHI and in TA 218 and TA 216, until this artillery and mortar fire was partially reduced.

Coordination in the Japs' use of artillery and mortar fire was demonstrated on IWO to a greater extent than has previously been experienced. Several barrages swept from Airfield No 1, down to the beaches. The use of mortar and of time fire against infantry working with tanks has been reported.

Mines were encountered buried on both the east and west beaches, on the approaches to SURIBACHI, in the vicinity of Airfield No 1, and on the airfield itself. In addition to these general areas, mines were encountered in quantity in use with main pillboxes. This was especially so in the defensive line extending across the island just north of airfield No 1. Types of mines varied, and included terracotta, horned and yardstick mines. All three of these were encountered in use as booby traps, both on level ground and in foxholes and dugouts. The 4th Marine Division reported that "A standard pattern has been observed for the laying of some mine fields. These small area fields are laid in a triangular pattern with seven yards interval between points. At each point, two mines are laid, three feet apart.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

NAVAJO TALKERS ON IWO

Specially trained Navajos have been used as special communicators for classified messages on voice circuits. Most of the traffic during the time Corps was afloat was by voice circuits, and the use of these Indians saved much time.

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These fields employ the wood box mine with a plastic pull and pressure device. Each box mine has about a 4-pound charge of explosive. The entire triangular pattern is connected with a trip wire. Personnel should be cautioned that tape measure mines have been frequently observed buried at the entrance and front of pillboxes." (Periodic Report #56, 4th Mar Div.)

Defense structures proved to be much heavier and more concentrated than was anticipated from study of photographs. The heavy guns on SURIBACHI were protected by a dense concentration of pillboxes and mines on the north base of the volcano. SURIBACHI itself contained 5-man caves on 3 levels, all connected underground. The largest cave, opening to the south was capable of housing 300 men and had five openings, according to a PW. The connecting installations were so extensive and the snipers so numerous, that it was necessary to destroy most of the installations completely by demolition, after the capture of SURIBACHI.

North of Airfield No 1, a defense line was encountered which held up the advance for more than two days. Mutually supporting pillboxes combined with heavy mortar and artillery fire to provide strong resistance to the advance of the Marines. Everywhere was evidence of advance preparation of the Jap defenses. He was thoroughly dug in with much concrete strengthening of his earthwork defenses and pillboxes almost "every ten feet."

An estimated 4,000 additional Navy troops, other than those previously estimated were identified on the island.

Both in practice and in theory the surrender attitude of the Japs was unchanged from the traditional.

(a) On several occasions, cornered Japs preferred suicide or suicidal attack to surrender, despite the enticement of language officers. At SURIBACHI, this was particularly true.

(b) An intercepted message on D-Day read, "We shall cooperate with the Army and defend this salient to the death."

As the Marines enlarged their beachhead and deepened their penetration, the Japs' artillery fire lessened somewhat in intensity, a result either of the fact that his guns had been knocked out or of a displacement of weapons to the rear. A planned withdrawal of artillery is believed to have occurred, as prepared and covered emplacements in the north were revealed by aerial photo interpretation.

The Jap attempted to compensate for this loss in fire power by maintaining the intensity of his mortar fire and by increasing the use of his dual purpose weapons. Mortar (81 mm and knee) and automatic small arms fire were extremely heavy, making progress difficult. His anti-tank fire was also effective.

--- continued on next page ---

BRIEFS

HOSPITAL SHIP DECEPTION

The ANA MARU arrived at SAIGON displaying a white cross flag. It unloaded 400 wounded and approximately 550 badly wounded. It also unloaded 30 tanks, 12 sedans, 1700 cases of motors, 30 machine guns and 30 trucks. (CHUNGKING, CHIN. Radio, 04 Mar 45) (Secret)

IWO JIMA OPERATION (CONTD)

One PW stated that general counterattacks were discouraged by Jap CO's, while gun and mortar positions were intact, but that after the permanent positions had been overrun, counterattacks were to be made at the discretion of the unit commanders.

A document captured by the 4th Mar Div indicated the growing realization on the part of the enemy of the value of captured documents, and illustrated their efforts to prevent the compromise of military material. Other indications that they were becoming increasingly security-minded were seen in their handling of their dead. Several caves were located with crematories and partially burned bodies and ashes in them. Similar removal and disposal of dead had been encountered on SAIPAN and had been suspected on IWO. No proof of it existed, however, until these caves were found.

NOTE:- Place references in the foregoing refer to Special Air and Gunnery Target Map; IWO JIMA. 1/5000, G-2, FMFPAC, 12 Nov 44.

ILLUSTRATIONS:- The pictures presented on the opposite and following pages are reproductions of those taken by the ASFEEIST-JICPOA Combat Intelligence Team in the Field. They show items of enemy equipment and weapons encountered on IWO JIMA.

BRIEFS

PONTOON TORPEDO BOAT

Jap diary taken at ANGIO, LUZON, reads for 8 Jan: "Approximately 50 enemy vessels appeared again (presumably LINGAYEN Bay). We sank 24 of them. We used BAKU (TN: following part torn) TEI (TN: Boat) (a pontoon made of veneer and with two torpedoes attached. Speed is 50 to 60 knots per hour and length is about 5m) (16.4 ft). (ATIS, SWPA Bull. #1760, 13 Feb 45) (Confidential)

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CAPTURED ON IWO JIMA

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Nos. 1, 2, 3, — 20 cm. Rocket Launcher.

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2.

3.



4. Lift for 20 cm. Rocket.

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CAPTURED ON IWO JIMA

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

5. Stand for Grenade Discharger (T-89)

6. Conical hand-thrown mines (AT)
Left-Type B, small single fuze, straw tail
Right-Type A, large double pin fuze, rope tail



7. Conical hand-thrown mine, Type A disassembled

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CAPTURED ON IWO JIMA



8. Prefabricated Jap Booby Trap – end view.



9. Improvised Booby Trap with pull igniter



10. Jap Booby Trap

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CAPTURED ON IWO JIMA

11. Terracotta Grenades packaged

→ 12. Jap Molotov Cocktail



13. Packaging of Jap Molotov Cocktail

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Rifles and Grenades

(From ATIS SWPA Enemy Publications Bulletin No 285
18 Jan 45)

The following notes are taken from a captured document entitled "Lessons from Actual Experiences in Eastern NEW GUINEA Operations, July 42 - April 43." The document was issued by Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and was captured at BULU MURLI, 4 June 1944.

Automatic Rifles:- "Many report the enemy possesses automatic rifles. Those who have observed them closely fear them as much as light and heavy MGs. The men will take a prone position and immediately stop advancing when they hear automatic rifle fire at close range. In so doing, however, they incur wounds. The men, therefore, must be trained not to fear automatic rifles."

Grenade Throwers:- "It has been a source of regret that grenade throwers, though an effective weapon, cannot be utilized in the jungle.

"The throwing range of hand grenades must be extended."

"The regular hand grenade is inconvenient to throw. We are able to throw grenades up to 20 to 25 m (66 to 82 feet), whereas the enemy throws them 50 m (164 ft)."

"An improved hand grenade made simply of iron wire with a Chinese type handle can be thrown 40 to 50 m (131 to 164 feet) by an ordinary person."

"Few hand grenades are carried by each individual, and thus it is best to issue to each soldier on the battlefield a hand grenade of the thick affixed wood type with two iron wires attached to the tail of the shell approximately 20 cm (11 inches) in extent. It is preferable to insert a piece of wood between these on the battlefield, but in case of emergency a hand grenade even without a handle can be thrown as far as 40 cm (131 feet)."

"It is necessary to train diligently in throwing hand grenades as prescribed in the training manual."

BRIEFS

JAPS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS

A MANILA newspaper, 7 Nov 44, carried the following: "Sgt HISAKAWA went to repulse the enemy formation of B-25's and P-38's. He shot down one airplane and caught the parachute of the pilot with his wing." (TN: reason given for doing that is as follows:) "If he missed in shooting the enemy pilot the latter will join the guerrillas in the mountains below. He is up for commendation." (ATIS, SWPA Bulletin #1756, 11 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Commando Instructions

(From ADVATIS SWPA Bulletin No 1732, 4 Feb 1945)

Captured at MOROTAI Island 30 Dec 1944 were loose hand-written sheets containing instructions for Commandos. The owner and unit were not stated. Extracts from the document follow:

"Fundamental instructions for Commando Groups (YUGEKI-GUMI) Leaders and Subordinates:

Conceal intentions: Keep the flanks moving and avoid air bombardment. Do not stop long at any one place. With the completion of the mission, the location will be moved. During this period everyone will be camouflaged. During the approach, take advantage of heavy rain storms and cold weather.

"Movement. Uniforms will be as light as possible.

"Selection of Personnel. Pick men who are daring, quick, healthy and conscientious or use experienced men.

"Essentials of Combat. Keep your sense of direction, watch your surroundings, always keep on the alert when approaching the enemy. Upon the discovery of the enemy, the group leader will signal by hand to take cover immediately. The targets will be the unit leader and then the individual soldiers. When within close range make certain of your aim. Surprise attacks will be aimed at patrols and guards.

"Targets for explosives will be the gasoline and ammunition dumps. The group leader will have his guards throw hand grenades into the gasoline and ammunition dumps.

"When assaulting, toss in hand grenades into the quarters of an enemy superior officer from the entrance.

"Precautions During the Execution of Missions. Fire with the idea of bringing down one enemy per round. When firing upon patrols, start firing at the first in line and then down in succession. Be calm and keep your sense of direction. During the execution of your mission do not talk. The leader will make it clear in regards to the assembly point and the time of arrival.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

ROCKET GUN BATTALION

Further information concerning the use of rocket weapons by the Japanese was gained when the 3d Rocket Gun Bn was identified in MANILA. This bn is reported to be equipped with 36 rocket guns of unknown type and calibre. (SWPA Radio CX 1146, 3 Mar 45) (SECRET)

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COMMANDO INSTRUCTIONS (CONTD)

When the enemy attacks, observe clearly the strength, armament and equipment of the enemy. Look for rations and clothing rather than anything else. Cut all(TN:(Illegible.) lines you see. It is very advantageous to attack during an air raid. When carrying out the attack wear rubber bifurcated shoes and beware of leaving footprints. When wounded men occur either hide their bodies or put them to death. Be sure that they do not fall into the hands of the enemy. When surrounded by the enemy, either break through or commit suicide. *In case of capture by the enemy, do not divulge information concerning unit code names, strengths, etc. Always return with evidence to verify battle results. Always use hand grenades to set fires. Always bring in hostile natives. Do not be afraid of the concentrated mortar fire which follows rifle shots and grenades. Bring in every native your see. Capture individual enemy soldiers if possible. Bring in anything which belongs to hostile natives."

*POACOMMENT:- One of the rare instances of Jap "Instructions in the event of capture."

* 信石

(From ATIS SWPA Enemy Publications No 307, 23 Jan 45)

Following is a brief extract from a Jap document captured at WHITE BEACH, HOLLANDIA. The document was entitled "Field Military Police Manual," and was issued by the Superior Officers' Club of Army MP School, approved by Army. The following extract is intended to warn the Japs against supposed use of Facteriological Warfare tactics by Allied forces.

"Bacteria and Poisons:- Frequently bacteria (cholera microbes) can be effectively dropped into wells. Poisons such as SHINSEKI 信石 and arsenic are used because they are easy to obtain, their efficiency is certain and they are difficult to discover. These are commonly put into food and drinks."

*SHINSEKI, a poison.

BRIEFS

ARMS AND THE MAN

"12 Feb: A new Nip idea on warfare is a recent order to three blacksmiths in CADLAN and SAN JOSE, barrios of PILI, to make spears. Output is 40 daily. Have been doing it two weeks and will still go on. Will use them on Americans, a Jap told blacksmith." (Hq VI Army G-2 Weekly Report No 75, 14 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Japs Hang On At Makin

(From letter 19 Jan 1945, Hq Island Command, Makin)

From November 1943 until January 1945 two Japanese managed to survive and escape detection by our occupying forces, on Makin Island. Troops presently stationed on islands previously Jap-held may find interesting and of cautionary value the following condensed account of two tenacious Jap hecklers on Makin.

The first report that Japs still existed on Makin was received 7 January 1945, when a native insisted that he had seen a Japanese with long hair and beard prowling around Flink Point near Okiangong Village. The matter was investigated, and a search made through the Mangrove swamps in the vicinity, but without any tangible evidence of the presence of any Japanese being found.

On 18 January, the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony Police reported that they had been fired upon by Japs and believed that they had seen them. A search was immediately instituted, and a thorough combing of approximately one square mile of Mangrove swamp begun. After about two hours of search, two Japanese huts were perceived well hidden in the swamp and very difficult of access.

Volunteers proceeded with extreme caution to within five yards of the huts. From here could be seen the bodies of two Japs, lying on the floor of one of the huts, with pools of blood under the heads. They had apparently killed themselves, in expectation of capture, one with a Japanese rifle and the other with a U.S. Carbine 30 calibre.

Immediate medical examination indicated that both Japanese were young and in good physical condition. They were well nourished and clean with well kept hands and feet. They were not suffering from any diseases or infections. Bits of paper, magazine and notebook clippings contained no intelligence of value, but only scribblings, as done by men obviously suffering from privation and loneliness.

BRIEFS

"A certain influential Pro-Japanese (Filipino) fell under suspicion, and was detained by a certain unit. After his release, he said: 'I have no statement to make; but I am through with the Japanese.' " - Jap document captured BAMBAN, LUZON, 27-29 Jan 45. (ATIS SWPA Bulletin No. 1830, 4 Mar 45) (Confidential)

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Jap Rocket-Powered Projectiles

(From V Amphib Corp's Landing Force in the Field letter 2 Mar 45.)

The following is a preliminary report of rocket-powered projectiles used by the enemy on IWO JIMA. The report is compiled by a US Army Ordnance Intelligence Officer attached to the landing force. A full report will be submitted on this subject when all information becomes available.

Rocket, 20cm (8 inch):- This is a rocket projectile with seven venturi tubes set on an angle in the base. The angle of the tubes causes a spin in flight helping to stabilize the projectile.

General Data: Weight - 190 pounds, approx.
Length - 41 inches
HE bursts - 28-30 pounds
Range - 1800 meters (1980 yards) maximum.

The 4th Marine Division D-2 Language Section has translated partial data on the mount, but the big factor is that the mount is very mobile and easily handled by a small number of men.

From several sources, further information indicates that the launcher is subject to overheating and is usually fired at a rate of two to three rounds in five minutes, then a 50-55 minute delay to allow the launcher to cool.



(Sketch not to scale - field drawing from fragments and memory)

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JAP ROCKET-POWERED PROJECTILES (CONTD)

Bomb Thrower, Rocket:- This is a method of launching the 63 Kg (132 lb) bomb from a land platform. The launcher is essentially only an inclined trough which may be set at 30° minimum to 50° maximum angle of elevation. The trough is approximately 18 feet long, easily assembled and very portable.

The initial experimental model of this type was recovered at SAIPAN. The one recovered on IWO JIMA has a larger motor and will have a longer maximum range although in all other particulars both will be identical.

General data: Projectile - 63 kg (132 lb) bomb
Motor - Length 41"
Diameter 7.5"
Weight empty - 55 lbs.
Propellant - Ballistite stick powder
25 lbs, (est)
Projectile maximum range - 1800 m (1980 yds, est.)

The motor is not permanently attached to the bomb and will fall away at the end of its driving thrust, allowing the bomb to continue its flight.



(Sketch not to scale - field drawing)

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JAP ROCKET-POWERED PROJECTILES (CONTD)

Rocket - 750 lb.:- The largest type of rocket projectile encountered to this date in this theater is a 250 kg (550 lb) bomb body with a rocket motor bolted to the closing plug. None has been captured intact, but data from fragments and other sources is complete enough for a preliminary report.

General data: - Weight over all - 750 lbs. (est)
Weight HE burster - 310 lbs (est)
Length over all - 100" (est)
Length of bomb body - 40"
Length of motor & tail - 60" (est)
Diameter throughout length - 12"
Maximum Range - 5,000 yds. (est)

The assembly is complete and fixed. Large fragments of motor body and tail are found since there is no direct action of the explosive on these components. The rocket motor assembly is unpainted, but the bomb body will be painted grey.



Rear View



(Sketch not to scale - field drawings from fragments)

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Nip Security Measures

(South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center
Report No 83, 1 Feb 1945)

Taken in the ARAKAN area, late Dec 44, torn sheets of paper included the following message:-

"The enemy is constantly endeavoring to secure information through his Burmese spies concerning the movements, strength and destination of this Heidan. Therefore to preserve secrecy of operations, each unit will strengthen its security measures, and the troops on the move will, by the use of deception, lead the enemy to believe that they are the YU (右住) Heidan moving up from the MALAYA-RANGOON direction. Each soldier must carry out his task to perfection. TAUNGUP, PROME, LETPADAN HENZADA, etc. are important junctions on the transport line, and may house enemy agents; the importance therefore of security measures cannot be over stressed. In addition, officers and men should be prohibited from coming into contact with the natives; attention should be given to this point."

Surprise Raiding Units

(From ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 1760, 13 Feb 45)

Captured at BINALONAN, LUZON, 19 Jan 45, was a bound mimeographed and handwritten reference file containing, among other things, descriptions of Jap small raiding parties and their use of Formosans.

These raiding parties have as their function the destruction of enemy guns, tanks, headquarters buildings and installations. Their composition and size will depend upon the nature of their mission, but ordinarily a three to five man group under a competent NCO, leading private, or first class private is considered desirable for a unit. A number of such groups (five three-man groups or three five-man groups) under the command of a suitable officer or NCO, can be used to stage raids deep into enemy territory through gaps in enemy dispositions, to attack many objectives at once (such as airfields, tank massing points, etc).

The document stated that TAKASAGO (Formosans) would be used for their special abilities in night reconnaissance (acuteness of vision and hearing), their ability to cope with rugged terrain and to see terrain features in the dark. They should be used as the "feelers" of the group during hidden movement. It is suggested that only explosives which are easy to handle be carried on raids. The relationship of master and servant must be strictly maintained between the TAKASAGO and the leader.

½ The three-man group is considered sufficient in most instances for attacks on enemy headquarters, signal stations, assembly points, and fuel and ammunition dumps. A large quantity of incendiaries is recommended for attacks on fuel and ammunition dumps.

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Further Discussion on Balloons

(From General Report #2 on Free Balloons and Related Incidents, WD, MID G-2, Wash. D.C. 23 Feb 45)

Since 4 Nov 44 there have been found in the United States, Canada, Alaska and Hawaii thirty balloons or balloon fragments of Japanese origin. Incendiary bombs were found with two of the balloons. Nine additional incidents of bomb recoveries or explosions have been reported. A number of other incidents and sightings, possibly related, have been reported.

GR #1 concluded that the balloons probably were launched from or near Japan. Since that report was published there have been additional reports of high altitude balloon sightings over Japan and Japanese-held territory. The XX and XXI Bomber Commands have reported a total of more than fifty free balloons of varying descriptions sighted on missions over Japan and Japanese-occupied China, commencing with the mission flown on 20 Aug 44. Most of the descriptions of the balloons so far received have not been detailed. The reported altitudes at which the balloons were seen range from 16,000 to 36,000 feet--heights considered impracticable for barrage balloons.

Although the ballast-release devices do not show any pattern of variation such as the envelopes and valves exhibit, wide variations in the setting of the aneroid-bellows switches have been found. They have been adjusted to operate at altitudes ranging from 15,000 to over 25,000 feet. Such variations possibly are caused by attempts to utilize the most favorable wind currents at different periods. Because of these variations, the self-destructive device of the balloons may operate at different altitudes. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that at any given altitude the balloons can be closely approached by aircraft with safety.

The manner in which the cargo was attached to the balloon found on 2 Feb 45, differed significantly from previous recoveries. The balloon had incendiary bombs attached to the periphery of the ring of the ballast-release apparatus instead of to the center of the device. Incendiaries attached to the periphery can be scattered along the route of the balloon, and thus the incendiary effect can be widely dispersed.

One rubberized-silk balloon was recovered with a small radio transmitter, the signal characteristics of which have been carefully analyzed. No radio equipment has been recovered with any of the paper balloons. The only indication that the paper balloons may carry radio transmitters is the fact that a large number of signals have been received from the general direction of the Pacific Ocean. Most of these signals have been received by stations on the West Coast and the fixes obtained have been inaccurate.

In one instance a transmitter was tracked by a D/F net during a period of nine hours and over a distance of 1,600 miles. Without allowing for inaccuracies in D/F fixes, the estimated speed was 174 miles per hour. In another instance, two accurate fixes, spaced approximately 1,800 miles apart, were obtained on what appeared to be the same transmitter at an interval of ten hours, indicating that the transmitter had moved at the rate of approximately 180 miles per hour in the meantine. A D/F net in Hawaii has tracked a radio transmitter over a distance of approximately 1,440 miles in ten hours.

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FURTHER DISCUSSION ON BALLOONS (CONTD)

A first reference to balloons in Japanese propaganda was made on 17 Feb 45 in a Domei broadcast in English beamed to the US. The Japanese claimed that 500 casualties had been inflicted in the US and that numerous fires had been started. The broadcast also announced that the authorities in the US had found it necessary to issue general warnings against attacks by the Japanese balloons and thus had aggravated unrest among the people. It was emphasized that these occurrences had shattered the American feeling of security against attacks by the Japanese. Domei said that the Japanese military authorities had refused to comment on the subject.

The broadcast may be the first of a series designed to conduct a war of nerves against the US. Subsequent Japanese broadcasts beamed to Europe, SE Asia and China have repeated this theme and, in one instance, added that several million airborne troops could be landed in the US in the near future.

NOTE: On the opposite and following pages are reproduced a chart and photographs of objects believed to have originated from Jap balloons. Opposite is a chart, showing frequency of balloon incidents.

Fig 1. Incendiary bomb dropped by balloon.

Fig 2. Bomb dropped by balloon.

Fig 3. Two of four incendiary bombs found. Shows general appearance and "T" shaped objects which suspended the bombs from the periphery of the weight release mechanism.

Fig 4. Demolition block found. Shows tin container and 1 pound Picric Acid charge. Holes on side and end are for blasting cap.

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BALLOON INCIDENTS



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

Fig. 1.

Incendiary bomb dropped by balloon.



Fig. 2.

Bomb dropped by balloon.

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

Fig. 3

Two incendiary bombs found in U.S.



Fig. 4

Demolition block found near incendiaries.

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Mines and Demolition

(From ATIS SWPA Bulletin No 1654, 20 Dec 1944)

A handwritten and mimeographed file on various subjects including improvised mines was taken in the DULAG area, LEYTE, 24 Oct 44. Extracts follow:

Block charge mine (Pressure igniter initiating type.)
Construction and functioning: Set four blasting caps in the upper portion of the box containing 8 kg (17.6 lbs) of KARITTO (TN: Ammonium perchlorate). Then place the four protruding nails on the inner side of the pressure board so that they will extend 1 cm (.34 in) into the top of the blasting cap. (TN: sic. - presumably in a hole in the blasting cap). Cut four grooves on the upper sides of the box and lay two weak cross pieces in them. This is to support the pressure board.

In operating the mine, pressure is applied on the pressure board which breaks the two cross pieces causing the nails to hit the blasting cap thus detonating the charge.







It must be made so that there is a clearance of 3 cm between the top of the charge and the box.

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Use: Bury it 5 cm (2 in) under the surface of the ground and camouflage. Bury at the left or right side of the road at a curve where the wheels of the vehicle will run over the mine.

Precautions in handling: When planting it be careful that the nails on the underside of the pressure board do not contact the blasting cap.

Block Charge Mine:- (electric blasting cap initiating types).
Construction and functioning. Place 8 kg (17.6 lbs) of KARITTO in a wooden box, insert four electric blasting caps at the top and connect the lead wires parallel to each other. To initiate the charge, connect the ends of the lead wires to a B 18 dry cell battery.



(B 18) Dry Cell Battery

Use: Anti-tank warfare.

Precautions in handling: Conceal and camouflage carefully so that the mine and the lead wire will not be detected by the enemy.

Reference: When using a Type 93 Exploder, connect in series.

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Any number of Type 98 Electric Caps under 40 can be initiated. The water-proof quality of the Type 98 Electric Cap is 12 hours in water, 1.5 m (5 ft) in depth.

Block Charge Mine (detonating cord initiating type).
Construction and functioning:- Place 8 kg (17.6 lbs) of KARITTO in a wooden box and set four blasting caps equally spaced in the top of the charge. Then insert a detonating cord into a blasting cap and extend the cord to the trench (approximately 20 m (65.6 ft)). Connect a slow burning fuse, 3 cm (1 in) to the end of the detonating cord and place a fuse igniter on the fuse. To operate rub the head of the fuse igniter on a match block or ignite with an ordinary match.

The fuse delay is 3 seconds and the action of the detonating cord is instantaneous.

Sketch showing the connection of the detonating cord and a safety fuze.



Use:- Anti-Tank warfare.

Precautions in handling:- Camouflage thoroughly so that the detonating cord and the mine will not be detected by the enemy. Rate of detonation of the detonating cord is 6000 m (19,680 ft) per sec. The covering on the detonating cord is water proof for 100 hours in 3 m (10 ft) of water.

BRIEFS

JAPANESE COMBAT INSTRUCTIONS

Included in "Combat Instructions" issued by the CO of an airfield battalion at CLARK FIELD was the following: "Think of NANKO (Classic Jap patriot) who defended CHIHAYA Castle. Pile up rocks and any materials on the ground and drop them on the enemy over the cliffs. You must bear in your minds that primitive methods are also effective in strategical warfare." (HQ, VI Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 75, 14 Feb 45) (Confidential)

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Jap Anti-Landing Defenses

(From WD, MID, Washington, D.C. letter 24 Jan 1945)

Evidence, if not experience, that the Japanese intend to use exploding and burning gasoline to oppose our landings, continues to accumulate. Documents captured on GUAM, PELELIU and SAIPAN describe the methods to be used. Prior to our landings on IWO JIMA, aerial photos had disclosed partially embedded gasoline drums along the water's edge and the beach. (NOTE:- These drums were found to be filled with small arms ammo. There has been no report that the drums were fired or detonated in any way.) Other evidence appears in a captured document which states that explodable drums of aviation gasoline form part of the obstacle network at YAP.

Obstacles of this type can be used against our landing forces in the following fashions:-

1. By embedding drums on the beaches about five yards apart, and exploding them by a master switch or individual trip wire system as landing troops reach the shore.

2. By floating them out to meet approaching landing craft and exploding them among the boats with machine gun fire.

3. By dropping fused drums of gasoline from aircraft.

4. By sinking the drums in water, puncturing them, and then igniting the escaping gasoline.

5. By pouring gasoline upon the water from the shore and igniting it.

Results of Experiments:- In one Japanese experiment three drums of 87 octane gasoline were laid 16 feet apart and connected with primacord which was wound six times around each drum. A detonator and safety fuze were fastened at one end of the primacord and two Molotov cocktails were bound to the middle drum.

In the resulting explosion, one drum had a bursting radius of 16 feet. Flames were 33 feet high, and the fire burned for 30 minutes. Two drums failed to ignite because of failure of the gasoline to run out of the drums.

A second experiment consisted of laying an iron pipe two and one-half inches in diameter from the shore into the water. Two and one-half drums of 87 octane aviation gasoline were fed into the shore end of the pipe, and after nine minutes the gasoline had flowed through the pipe and covered the water 325 feet along the beach for a width of 65 feet. Calcium phosphide pellets were fired into the gasoline, causing it to explode instantly and shower flames into the air 55 feet high, 45 feet wide and 260 feet in length for three minutes.

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JAP ANTI-LANDING DEFENSES (CONTD)

In another test, weighted drums of aviation gasoline were thrown into the sea. Machine gun fire was placed on the drums to make the fuel run out, and after seven minutes, gasoline covered the water 26 feet long and 6 feet wide. Calcium phosphide pellets were dropped nearby. Flames were 26 feet high, and the fire burned for several minutes. By test it was found impractical to mix crude oil and gasoline. The combustion of the crude oil was imperfect and both the firepower and burning time were noticeably lessened.

Comment:- No reports have been received to the effect that our troops have encountered Japanese obstacles of this type on any operations. However, at KALEWA, BURMA, on the CHINDWIN River, British troops of the 11th East African Division discovered 400-500 drums of oil or gasoline lined up on the east bank. About 40 of the drums had model 99 magnetic mines attached to them and they were connected with primacord. It is possible that these drums were part of an uncompleted plan to set the CHINDWIN on fire at a place where the East Africans were expected to cross the river.

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Change in Suicide Doctrine

A more economical employment of suicidal fervor was explained by Domei correspondents who declared that Gen YAMASHITA himself had told his men to die only after inflicting greatest possible damage. The new troop indoctrination was said to have been applied at IWO JIMA as well.

Domei writers explained that this "radical" departure from the idea of always leaving on infiltration missions with death for the emperor an uppermost objective has inspired LUZON and IWO Japs to great feats and high morale. The fact that a commander of great caliber had ordered his men to try to return alive was eagerly explained chiefly to export beams; apparently the superstitions of homeland Japs have been "shocked" enough lately. Oblique explanations of the new troop spirit were used at home thus, "Each soldier is sworn to kill ten enemies." Radio outbursts have featured "death is not always victory" themes.

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Jap Chief of Staff Talks

(From ADVATIS Translation No 49, ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 151, 16 Feb 45)

Following is an outline of a talk given by the Chief of Staff of the 26th Division at a meeting of key organization personnel, 13 Jan 44:-

"We face the third year of the Greater East ASIA War, upon which the fate of the Empire hangs, at a time when the general aspect of the situation has become more critical and intense. At this time, an epoch-making reorganization is to be carried out. The North CHINA Army has conserved its strength for the past several years to be thrown into the decisive battlefield of the Empire.

"Instructions - Attitude to be taken towards reorganization:- The picked groups (HEIDAN) of the North CHINA Army are to be sent gradually to other areas. New groups are to be organized to replace these and our own group (HEIDAN) will have to contribute a large number of cadre personnel. Hereafter the group (HEIDAN) will have to carry on with its present complex and difficult mission with fewer and younger cadre personnel and low quality equipment. Changes in the situation demand that we accept even greater responsibilities in the accomplishment of our mission.

"Firm discipline and 'Esprit de Corps' This reorganization will drain heavily upon the cadre of the various units - the infantry and artillery units in particular. In view of these changes, utmost effort must be expended to maintain and develop the tradition of the groups.

"Honor is Strength: Higher authorities have already requested that personnel and equipment selected for the reorganization be of excellent quality and character. This must be done with a sense of sacrifice based upon a moral responsibility. The difficulties encountered due to the frequent reorganizations and transfer of personnel are appreciated. The further selection and transfer of a large cadre places even greater stress on the group. The newly activated groups will not have time to assemble and undergo training. They will of necessity be on scattered garrison (KEIBI) duty.

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BRIEFS

JAP REACTIONS TO PROPAGANDA

"An IFBU officer reports the statement of a Burman interrogated in January on the 20th Division front: 'Jap troops on reading propaganda leaflets dropped by the F.A.F. burst into tears and one officer committed suicide on the spot.' Unfortunately we do not know what leaflet produced this immediate and eminently satisfactory reaction." (PROPSIG Letter No 17, 2 Feb 45) (SECRET)

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JAP CHIEF OF STAFF TALKS (CONTD)

"These troops do not have the glorious tradition or the firm 'esprit de corps' that our group has. Every effort must be expended to develop an 'esprit de corps' by sending out large numbers of excellent cadre personnel. Otherwise it will be extremely difficult for these groups to accomplish their missions.

"Transfer of personnel for the expansion of air personnel:- Plans have been made requiring a large number of NCOs for the expansion of the air personnel and of the shipping personnel. The replacement policy of this plan requires over ¼ replacements with the need for NCO replacements particularly acute. With this situation in mind special consideration must be given to the selection of NCO candidates for this year.

"Ordnance materiel:- The division has a considerable amount of additional ordnance materiel. The majority of the standard equipment will be used for the Table of Equipment for the newly activated groups. In the near future captured equipment and locally manufactured ordnance will be used in part, to bring the Table of Equipment up to standard. The quantity and quality of arms must be expected to be of lower standard.

"Supplies of ammunition and fuel have been consumed in great amounts, and conditions are such that ammunition for operations cannot be issued for the time being. These deficiencies must be made up by training and care of ordnance materiel.

"The above are the main points to be considered in assisting higher headquarters in the coming reorganization."

TN: - Notation in pencil "Take counter-espionage measures against the enemy discovering our reorganization and their taking the offensive."

Jap 88mm AA Gun

(From ATIS Bulletin #1521, 24 Oct 44)

Increasing evidence that an 88mm gun is in extensive use in the AA defense of the Japanese home islands warrants publication of the following data on this gun. This data was contained in a hand-written notebook captured in SWPA, owner and unit not stated, date unknown and published by ATIS, SWPA.

Although ammunition for the 88mm gun was found on SAIPAN none of these weapons has been captured to date. Information from various PsW indicates that these guns are now being produced in some quantity and are already in use in the defense of Japan, and fragments of the Type 100, 88mm fuze have been removed from the wings and fuselages of B-29s after an attack on the TOKYO Bay area. As the 88mm guns become available they will probably replace the 75mm weapon as the standard AA gun of the Jap Army. This new gun is apparently a modern and efficient weapon and far superior to the old Model 88, 75mm Gun.

Data on the Experimental Type 99, 88mm AA gun, as published in ATIS Bulletin No 1521 follows:

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(TN: Pertinent technical data on the Experimental Type 99 B 8 cm AA Gun have been fully extracted. The term KOSHAHO leads to the conclusion that the gun is an Army Type AA Gun. While no information is given as to the fire control instruments used with this gun there is a brief reference to its use with the Type 97 AA Director.)

General description:-

This fixed type gun is designed primarily for use as AA, but is capable of flat trajectory fire.

The tube assembly consists of the tube proper and the breech (TN: Presumably breech ring.) which is bolted on the tube. The tube is connected to the recoil and recuperator mechanism by means of the recoil piston rod and the counter-recoil rod respectively.

The breech mechanism opens to the bottom and is of the vertical sliding wedge type. The breech opening and closing mechanism operate automatically. The breech mechanism incorporates the following:

1. Breech opening and closing mechanism.
2. Firing mechanism
3. Safety mechanism
4. Extractor.

Breech Opening and Closing Mechanism:
The breech block is opened by means of the rotation of the breech actuating lever and is of conventional design. When the breech block is open, it engages the extractor pawl which prevents its rising (closing). As a round is loaded, the rim of the cartridge case depresses the extractor and disengages it from the breech block allowing the latter to close.

The outer cylinder of the automatic breech opening and closing mechanism is connected to the cradle while the breech opening and closing mechanism plunger is connected to the breech actuating lever. The plunger is spring loaded forward and housed in the outer cylinder. As a round is loaded and the extractor disengaged from the breech block, the plunger moves forward and rotates the actuating lever which closes the breech block. As the gun is fired, the plunger recoils with the tube and upon counter recoil, the plunger is locked in its housing by the action of the retaining plate. During this operation, the plunger rotates the breech actuating lever and opens the breech block. As soon as the breech is fully open the retaining plate disengages the plunger from its housing and the plunger becomes spring loaded forward by the force of its spring, and is in a position to close the breech block.

Firing Mechanism:
When the breech is completely closed the firing pin engages the cocking pawl which, in turn, is locked by the sear. When the trigger is pulled the sear shaft is rotated, disengaging the cocking pawl and sear, thus allowing the trigger to fire the gun. Once the firing pin moves forward it will not return to its original (cocked) position if the breechblock remains closed, even though the trigger is released. In order to fire the gun again after a misfire, cock the piece by fully retracting the cocking lever with the lanyard. Whether or not the firing pin is retracted can be determined by the appearance of the rear end of the firing pin as viewed through the aperture in the base plug of the firing pin housing.

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JAP 88MM AA GUN (CONTD)

As the breech block opens after firing, the cocking pawl and cocking pawl shaft are rotated in passing over the breech recess, thus retracting the firing pin.

Safety Mechanism:
When the handle of the safety plunger is turned to the right, the trigger is rendered safe and the breech block is locked in the closed position. There is a cocking pawl shaft stop which prevents rotation of the shaft in case the breech is not fully closed, thus preventing premature firing. However, after the breech is fully closed, the cocking pawl shaft stop is disengaged from the cocking pawl shaft, thus allowing the cocking pawl to engage the sear and assume the firing position. Accordingly, after the breech has once been completely closed, the trigger may be actuated, even though the breech block may have opened slightly, and may cause accidental firing.

Extractor assembly:
The extractor assembly is of conventional design.

The cradle is of the cylindrical type and encases the tube. The recoil mechanism is on the top center section of the cradle between two recuperators. The cradle is mounted on the pedestal spindle by means of trunnions. The elevating arc gear is attached to the lower face of the cradle.

The recoil mechanism is hydraulically operated and has a counter-recoil buffer. Standard recoil is 360mm, and 400mm is the maximum recoil.

There are two recuperators of the spring type.

The traversing mechanism is mounted on the ring gear which is secured to the gun carriage. The traversing mechanism is gear driven and traverses the components which rest on the pedestal spindle. It has a high speed traversing mechanism to lay the piece in azimuth.

The pedestal spindle bears the cradle and rotates within the pedestal. The sight assembly and laying gear are attached to both sides of the spindle.

The pedestal is bolted to the gun platform and the platform is bolted to the base.

Nomenclature and number of accessories.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

VOLUNTEERS - YOU AND YOU AND YOU

"All platoon leaders were assembled and it was announced that a Suicide Assault Unit, and Assault Units on Tank Positions were to be organized. Volunteers were asked for, but others were ordered to complete the numbers required. We are to undertake special training." - Diary Notebook taken MOROTAI, 7 Jan 45. (ATIS, SWPA Bulletin #1734, 9 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Specifications:

Tube assembly:
The tube is of auto frettaged construction and has a removable liner.

Bore	88mm
Length (45 calibers)	3.959m
Rifling	
Number of lands and grooves	32
Depth (of groove)	1mm
Pitch	6°
Type of breech block	Vertical sliding wedge type
Total weight	1.230 metric tons

Cradle:

Weight	Approximately 570 kg

Recoil System:

Type	Floating piston - Throttling valve type
Type of recoil fluid	Recoil fluid B (OTSU)
Volume of fluid	Approx 5.9 liters
Standard recoil	360mm to 390mm
Maximum recoil	430mm
Weight	Approximately 90 kg

Recuperator System:
Consists of a right and left unit

Type	- - - - - - - - - -
Weight (two units)	- - - - - - - - - -
Counter-recoil springs	- - - - - - - - - -

Gun Carriage

Type	Fixed pedestal type
Weight (with elevating and traversing mechanism)	2.220 metric tons

Elevating Mechanism:

Limits of elevation	-7° to + 80°
Elevation from one turn of hand wheel	4 2/16°

Traversing Mechanism:

Field of traverse	360°
Traverse from one turn of hand wheel	3 10/16°

Gun Platform:

Weight	Approximately 700 kg

Shield: (Consists of a left and right unit)

Weight (two units)	1.600 metric tons

Gun battery:

Total weight (without fire control instruments)	Approximately 6.500 metric tons (14.332.5 lb)
Height of axis of bore	Approximately 1.800 m
Total length (with tube horizontal)	Approximately 4 m
Total width (without shield)	Approximately 2.300 m
Total heighth(0° elevation)	Approximately 2.150 m
Total height (80° elevation)	Approximately 4.600 m

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Burma Tactics and Strategy of the Japs

(From Supplement No 1, Dec 1944, "Tactics and Strategy of the Japanese Army in the Burma Campaign" prepared by US Military Observer Group in India and Joint Intell. Collection Agency.)

One point of tactics at variance with American teaching is the Japanese practice of defending a river line by placing the defenses on the enemy side of the stream. Frequently it was found that once the resistance on the near side of the river was overcome there was little or no further resistance offered to the Allied crossing.

It was found that the Japanese were very sensitive in their rear. By using the time-tried Japanese tactics of enveloping and by-passing Allied troops frequently caused the enemy to withdraw from prepared positions without serious contact. At WALABUM, SHADUZUP, INKANGATAWNG and SETON it was found that a roadblock in the rear of the Japanese followed by a close-in envelopment confused and disorganized the enemy.

Antitank mines and booby traps were not extensively used. No new information about booby traps was received.

Field fortifications were characterized by their great strength and depth. Rifle pits were frequently six to eight feet in depth, and with a dugout at the bottom. Weapon emplacements almost invariably had strong overhead cover. Camouflage was excellent and camouflage discipline rigidly adhered to.

The Japs used a second line of defense, prepared about 200 yards to the rear of the first line and manned by the local reserve and mortar crews. Each strong point was manned by a total of 30-50 men. Road blocks were in depth and manned by 100-150 men.

Field fortification positions were invariably underground. Rifle pits were well camouflaged and sited for good field of fire. Some pits were found which were six to eight feet deep with a firing step about four feet from ground level. Frequently rifle pits connected with adjacent dugouts by short trenches or tunnels.

Defensive operations fell into four general patterns:-

1. Small groups of Allied troops were allowed to penetrate the Japanese position. The attackers were then cut off by fire and/or movement and an effort made to eliminate them by rifle, knee mortar, heavy mortar and 70mm gun fire.

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BRIEFS

JAP PAPERS LAUD RAMMING

"Honorable Mention" was given in MANILA newspapers, 22 Nov 44: "In the attack on LEYTE Bay, the following men crashed their airplanes into enemy ships. They are: 2d Lt NAKASHIMA, 2d Lt NISHI, Sgt Maj KAMATA, and Sgt Maj YOSHINO."
(ATIS, SWPA Bulletin #1756, 11 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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2. Attacking Allied troops were allowed to advance across the open ground before the Japanese positions and reach within a few yards of Japanese riflemen before the enemy opened fire. The enemy did not hesitate to place fire on, or very close to his own positions.

3. When Allied firepower was insufficient to keep Japanese fire down, he would defend by fire.

4. A favorite Japanese trick was to employ small patrols to penetrate into Allied rear areas at night and by fire cause friendly troops to fire into adjacent units.

The enemy's method of employing his artillery gave the impression that he had much less artillery than he had. The later capture of so much artillery came as a consequent surprise. Some reasons for this impression were:-

1. Mass fires of more than one battery were never used.
2. Single concentration seldom contained more than 10 rounds.
3. Concentrations, apparently unobserved, fired frequently by one gun.
4. The small amount of ammunition expended per day. After 10 March, the greatest number of rounds fired in one day was 250, all calibers (not including 70mm Infantry Gun), This was near JAMBU BUM.
5. The reason the enemy held much of his artillery back was that he was short of ammunition, and realized that there was no use emplacing more guns than he could provide with ammunition.

The enemy spent a large percentage of his ammunition trying to counter-battery our artillery. This fire was obviously unobserved and almost entirely ineffective. The enemy, having withdrawn over this ground, was thoroughly familiar with the likely battery positions. However, he apparently made no survey and fired entirely from map data. The maps were very inaccurate. His choice of area to be fired on was apparently made on direct estimates based on sounds of our fire.

Japanese camouflage was everywhere excellent. Natural cover of overhanging brush was often used. Where necessary, this was supplemented by cut branches. Each gun was usually emplaced inside an A shaped bunker. Bunkers were low with log sides and frequently covered with two layers of logs with dirt on top; at other times, open. Fields of fire were often very limited, the weapon emplaced for firing on troops advancing on or near the one highway.

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BRIEFS

IT SAYS HERE...

A MANILA newspaper stated on 22 Nov 44: "25 B-29's were shot down in yesterday's raid over Western KYUSHU. One of them was dropped by Lt (jg) SAKAMOTO, when he crashed into the B-29. (ATIS, SWPA Bulletin #1756, 11 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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In operating their anti-tank guns, the Japs learned very soon that the most vulnerable hit on a light tank was a hit in the gas tank. In practically every case of tanks destroyed by 37mm gun fire, a hit was directed against the gas tanks.

Jap defense against tanks was simple, because of the fact that in most cases tanks were confined to the road. Guns were invariably sited in pairs from covered emplacements located from 30 to 100 feet from the road and normally firing directly across the road. Machine gun emplacements were used to protect the anti-tank gun emplacements. Whenever they were available, the anti-tank gun emplacements were located in the vicinity of large trees which would prevent the tanks from overrunning the gun position. The anti-tank defensive system showed careful coordination between ant -tank guns, automatic weapons, and magnetic mine thrower teams. The mplacements were skillfully constructed and very carefully concealed. Tank crews very rarely saw an emplacement until the gun fired. Whenever possible, the Japanese located their anti-tank guns on the far bank of streams. Since most of the streams encountered had sheer, steep banks from 12 to 15 feet, they presented a very difficult object to cross. Practically every stream encountered had a minimum of four anti-tank guns located on the far bank, covering the road. It is very peculiar but most of the bridges across these streams were not blown up. The Japanese apparently depended on the vulnerability of the light tanks to prevent their crossing the bridges in the face of gun fire, and the flimsiness of the bridges which would not allow medium tanks to cross them. The highest known density of anti-tank guns located was 14 anti-tank guns on a 350 yard front. The principal defense was located on the far bank of the PANGYU HKA and consisted of eight anti-tank guns, in very strong emplacements, covering the bridge. The other six guns were located in such thick jungle that tanks could not get in to them. These guns were so located that they fired into the sides of any tanks engaging the anti-tanks defending the bridge crossing. Twelve of the guns are known to have been destroyed by medium tanks, but after the position was finally taken, two emplacements were found which had never had a shot fired at them. Once the anti-tank defense had been disrupted, protecting automatic weapons generally faded into the jungle and were rarely seen by the tank crews. If infantry did not immediately occupy the position, as soon as the tanks withdrew, the defense was immediately reorganized. The Japanese soon learned that we only had a few medium tanks and that they could not harm them. Whenever possible, they prevented giving away their position to medium tanks and waited before opening fire on the following light tanks. However, once an anti-tank gun was located, the gun crew fought with great bravery and skill. Some medium tanks were hit as many as nineteen times before they could knock an emplacement out and destroy its crew. All anti-tank personnel encountered were highly trained, efficient soldiers. In every case where tank personnel committed a tactical error, the anti-tank personnel took full advantage of it.

BRIEFS

JAP GAS IN 1935

From PW it is learned that in 1935, Jap troops were known to have used gas to suppress TAKASAGO tribesmen in the mountains E of TAICHU, FORMOSA. PW heard that 200 or 300 out of 1,000 natives died. The use of the gas was kept secret, but PW's friends had told him about seeing discolored bodies of dead tribesmen. (ATIS, SWPA Bul 776, 3 Mar 45) (Confidential)

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Manpower Mobilization Measures in Japan

(From OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A No 1987, Dec 1944)

The long war with China and the mounting strength and success of the Allies in the past year have placed an unprecedented burden on Japan's munition industries and war workers. Despite Japanese boasts that their large population could staff both industry and the armed forces without undue strain, the government has had to exercise increasing control over manpower. Although the mobilization of manpower in Japan has been less stringent than in Great Britain or Germany, the Japanese have gone further than the United States in controlling the labor market. As in other countries, the manpower problem in Japan is principally one of recruiting and training sufficient numbers of soldiers and workers. In addition, the manpower needs of the armed forces have to be reconciled with those of industry, just as the labor requirements of agriculture have to be adjusted to those of the munition industries. In Japan, the occupational and geographic transferenae of workers and employers on a large scale was attempted at the same time that excessive mobility was curbed and wages were controlled. Measures to increase productivity were also undertaken, and in this aspect of manpower mobilization as well as in others, Japan has employed practically every method and procedure used by European countries. The extent to which the legal measures herein mentioned have been enforced cannot be accurately determined.

The recruitment and training of the military forces were simpler in Japan than in Britain or the United States. Compulsory military conscription had been introduced in 1872, shortly after the MEIJI restoration, and a large body of trained men has always been available for military service. The basic Conscription Law, amended many times, still regulates the size, composition, training, and organization of the armed forces. War-time changes have been directed chiefly towards an increase in the numbers trained, a lowering of the physical qualifications for active service, an extension of the age classes liable to call-up, and the mobilization of the various reserve groups for active duty.

Mobilization of civilian labor was authorized by the National General Mobilization Act of 1938. The manpower provisions of the Act authorized the Government to compel civilians to take war jobs; regulate the employment and dismissal of workers; control wages and hours; prohibit labor disputes; require employers to use labor efficiently; and compel schools and factories to provide technical and vocational training. Although not all of these powers were used immediately and some were applied piecemeal, the Government was using most of its mobilization authority by 1944.

The conscription of labor did not really begin until 1942; prior to that time registrations were taken of skilled workers, professionals and scientists, seamen, and students. In 1943 and 1944 unskilled male workers and women were registered. Although women were not officially conscripted until Aug 1944, they were, in effect, conscripted through the "voluntary" patriotic organizations. Employers also were forced to give up their businesses and ships to a considerable extent and take war jobs as employees. Conscripted workers had lower wages and less desirable working conditions than other workers, though certain

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compensating payments, housing and feeding schemes were provided. A strong military flavor was given to labor conscription by the use of military "ranks"for workers.

Although unoccupied members of the population could be drawn into war work through conscription, other measures were also used to enlist labor reserves. The chief source of additonal labor was unoccupied women. Several million left their housework to help out in farms and to work in factories, either as a result of persuasion or coercion. Students were compelled to contribute their labor, either on a part-time or on a full-time basis. The closing of schools, shortening of courses, and conversion of schools to factories speeded up the work program for students. Foreign workers (chiefly Koreans and some Chinese), disabled war veterans, older workers and part-time work by business men and women provided other sources of labor.

The addition of new workers to the labor supply was supplemented by measures to allocate workers according to a war production plan. Transference of workers was undertaken on a large scale. Material shortages, conversion orders, concentration programs, and ordinances prohibiting men to work in certain occupations forced many workers to change their jobs. To expedite transfers, the percentage of women to be employed in various industries was determined by the Government. Excessive job mobility was also a problem, because too many youths were leaving the farms to work in munitions factories and skilled workers were pirated by employers who gave wage increases. Turnover controls were devised to restrict movement where it interfered with efficiency.

Further gains were sought through increased productivity. Changes in hours of work, training programs, measures to decrease industrial accidents and to improve health and efficiency have been utilized. The first effect of the war against China was to lengthen the already long working hours but the effect on accident rates and health was so deleterious that ordinances restricting working hours were passed in 1938 and 39. After PEARL HARBOR, there was a return to long hours which since then have been maintained. Since industrial accidents and illness increased markedly, remedial programs were devised to counteract the effects of longer hours, lower living standards, greater proportions of inexperienced workers and women. Several kinds of training schools have been established and many special courses are provided for women, skilled technicians, factory apprentices, and other groups. Greater efficiency has also been fostered by means of a type of military organization in the factory and a system of awards and medals.

Wage control was initiated because workers frequently were changing jobs to secure pay raises. Employers also were outbidding one another for skilled workers. Despite the need for wage control, the Government's ordinances exempted many workers from the wage regulations. As a result, wage control was applied piecemeal and not very stringently. The payment of bonuses and family allowances further complicated the intricate system of wage-payment forms which in itself constituted an obstacle to successful wage control.

By and large, the Japanese appear to have managed their manpower mobilization program with considerable success, relying on a combination of totalitarian methods and patriotic appeals.

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